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The verified alpha deployment runs runtime spec 130 / transaction version 6. Policy document publication was activated in spec 129 on October 17, 2026; strict did:openpayload: identity validation followed on October 18. OpenPayload separates policy publication from policy execution. The chain checks publication authority, revision, nonce, expiry, and the integrity of the exact signed document bytes. Directory and executing services interpret supported document formats and enforce routing, action, and domain permissions against finalized state. The chain does not parse policy rules, actions, URLs, or workflows.

Policy documents

Publish through the policy document routes. The HTTP route generation is v4; the supported document format is openpayload-policy, version 1. These version numbers describe different contracts. A document contains format, version, ruleset, and optional policy_ttl_seconds. Scope, owner, revision, and content hash are publication metadata outside the document. Documents may contain up to 65,536 exact bytes. Once prepared and signed, those bytes must not be reformatted or reserialized. application_id selects the Application policy. The public envelope’s tag is a separate application-defined classification that conditions may match. Neither field proves that the sender is the application operator. policy_ttl_seconds bounds policy lookup caching to 1–300 seconds, with a default of 60. It does not retain messages. Requested Cache retention belongs to delivery constraints and remains subject to network ceilings.

Rules and events

All conditions in a rule must match. The highest numeric priority wins within a policy; ruleset order breaks a tie. For a recipient addressed through a Persona, a matching Persona rule takes precedence over DID routing. Application event actions run independently and cannot change recipient routing or retention. Supported conditions include TagEquals, TagPrefix, TagAbsent, RecipientEquals, RecipientIn, and EventEquals. Events include:
  • RelayAccepted: ingress checks passed and processing can begin; delivery has not necessarily succeeded.
  • RelayDelivered: local recipient delivery completed.
  • CacheStored: the encrypted envelope was durably stored.
A version-1 document can express a direct Call, Send, Forward, Store, Archive, or RequireProfile action. Reject and BaseDidDelivery are also supported. A Workflow action expresses a bounded step-and-transition plan. Event-bound plans contain only Send and Call actions. Services reject unsupported formats or actions instead of treating them as executable instructions. For example, after registering an Application and binding a DNSSEC-verified domain that its control DID owns, publish this document to request a Call after Cache storage. Replace push.example.com with your authorized receiver hostname.
The application receiver defines what sendPush means. OpenPayload does not interpret it as a built-in notification command.

Payload templates

Send and Call use a public JSON object in payload_template. A field such as { "$from": "/event/message_recipient_did" } copies the referenced value without changing its type. Available roots are /envelope/, /event/, /policy/, and /node/. Missing references fail the action. Templates are limited to 4096 UTF-8 bytes, 16 levels, and 256 JSON nodes. Templates can carry an application-defined context.app_signature; the application must define and verify it. A node signature alone does not prove original application identity or that a delivery event occurred. Do not publish secrets, provider credentials, or plaintext message contents in policies or public envelope metadata.

Send and Call

Send names recipient_did and payload_template. The executing node encrypts the rendered control payload to the destination DID’s published agreement key and signs the new envelope with its node DID root key. An Application may Send only to its control DID or an explicitly linked DID. The receiver validates the node’s authority and any application proof. Call names a complete HTTPS url and payload_template. The node posts to that exact URL, including its path; it does not append a callback path or discover a destination DID service. Call authority comes from the policy scope:
  • A DNS Persona policy uses its scope ID as the authorized domain.
  • An Application uses its bound domain, which must be an active DNS Persona owned by its control DID.
  • DID and single-label Persona policies cannot contain Calls; Send remains available.
The hostname must equal the authorized domain or a dot-separated descendant. An active Persona for example.com can authorize push.example.com, including delegated subdomains, but cannot authorize notexample.com. Expiry or transfer disables Calls under the old owner. Executing services recheck current authority before acting. The Directory and executing services enforce canonical URL and destination rules. URLs are limited to 4096 ASCII bytes; credentials, query strings, fragments, IP-literal hosts, invalid escapes, and nonpublic destinations are rejected. Nodes check resolved addresses and TLS and do not follow redirects. The chain validates the signed publication envelope, not URL semantics. The HTTPS POST body contains signed_payload_b64 and signature_b64. Decode the first field and verify the Ed25519 signature over those exact decoded bytes using the root verification key of node_did. The signed JSON uses protocol: "openpayload:policy-call:v2" and binds the URL, rendered payload, policy identity and revision, scope, event, original message, recipient, node identity, timestamps, and call_id. The receiver must check freshness, its expected URL, current policy and domain authority, and whether the node is trusted for the claimed Relay or Cache role. Deduplicate call_id before acting. Any HTTP 2xx response completes the Call step; it should mean durable acceptance by the receiver. HTTP 408, 429, and 5xx can be retried until the event expires. HTTP acceptance is not recipient acknowledgement.

Persona-gated delivery

A supported workflow can require openpayload:persona-release:v1 before routing. A compatible client resolves the delivery target, encrypts the payload using the required profile, signs it, and submits it to a Relay. The Relay checks the public profile shape and policy binding. The Relay cannot prove how opaque plaintext was encrypted or enforce a processor’s unlock decision. Recipient software verifies processor proofs and applies the application’s unlock rules.

Revisions, clearing, and legacy policies

A scope’s first document publication uses revision 1. Each replacement or clear advances that document revision. The owner nonce is shared across the owner’s document-policy scopes and is separate from historical typed-policy nonces. A document record takes precedence over frozen V3/V2 policies for the same scope. Invalid or unsupported document bytes are an error, never permission to use an older policy. Clearing retains an explicit empty record that suppresses older policies for that scope. Normal selection can still continue from Persona to DID when appropriate. Legacy typed policy writes are retired. Frozen reads remain for scopes without a document record. Use the version-aware resolution endpoint, POST /delivery-policies/v4/resolve, for current integrations. Keep storage generation, revision, and finalized block context together when caching policy results.

Talaria Chat example

Talaria Chat is a separate messaging application using OpenPayload. Its Application registration and domain binding are established, its CacheStored-to-Call policy was published and verified on October 17, and its push receiver and network services were updated on October 18. The receiver interprets sendPush as an application wake request while the encrypted message stays in Cache. End-to-end background push still needs a fresh test after the receiving device’s identity update. Deployed components do not establish a verified notification-delivery outcome.